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How Amenities Affect Job and Wage Choices over the
Life Cycle
by Ed Nosal and Peter Rupert
Observing the current wage at a job may not fully reflect the “value” of that job. For example, a job with
a low starting wage may be preferred to a high starting wage job if the growth rate of wages in the former
exceeds the latter. In fact, differences in wage growth can potentially explain why a worker might want to
quit a high paying job for a job with a lower initial wage. Job amenities are shown to be another important
factor that not only influence the value of a job but also provide an independent rationale for why workers
change jobs. The inclusion of a job amenity as part of the “value” can also generate a move from either
high-paying to low-paying or low-paying to high-paying jobs as part of an optimal consumption plan over
the life cycle. Both the direction of movement and the timing of a job change are shown to depend
critically on the relationship between the worker’s rate of time preference and the market interest rate.
JEL Classification: J2, J3, J6
Key Words: job changes, amenities, lifetime wage profile1 Introduction
Models of the labor market typically use the wage as a statistic that determines such things as
whether to enter the labor force, what job to take, how many hours to work, and so on. In other
contexts, it compensates for certain job characteristics, such as required hours of work, risk of
injury, or other job speciﬁc amenities or disamenities.1
In this paper job amenities are explicitly included as part of a job to address several questions
concerning the sequencing of job choices and wage changes over the life cycle. How does the
presence of a job speciﬁc amenity affect initial job choice? How do amenities affect job mobility
over the life cycle? How does the presence of a job amenity affect the observed wage proﬁle?
To answer these questions a life cycle model is constructed that allows workers to choose their
career path over various jobs, where a job is deﬁned by a wage and amenity bundle. There is no
uncertainty over the level of wages and amenities at all jobs. The extent to which wages and the
level of the amenity are substitutable in preferences is shown to play a key role in the analysis. In
a version of the model where the level of the amenity is ﬁxed for a given job and wages and the
amenity are not substitutes, workers will always want to change jobs over their lifetimes. Some
workers will initially choose high paying jobs and will migrate to lower paying ones; other workers
will follow precisely the opposite strategy. The key variable that determines the choice of jobs
over time is the worker’s rate of time preference. Workers who have a relatively high rate of time
preference will move to higher paying jobs over their lifetimes, while those who have a relatively
low rate of time preference will move to lower paying jobs. Note that even if the individual moves
from a higher wage to a lower wage job, this move gives higher lifetime utility as compared to
staying in the higher wage job. In another version of the model where wages and the amenity are
perfect substitutes, workers may not necessarily want to change jobs. But when they do change
jobs, as in the case where wages and amenities are not substitutes, the key variable that determines
the pattern of job choices is the worker’s rate of time preference.
As mentioned above, an intriguing ﬁnding in this paper is that it may be optimal for workers
to move from higher to lower paying jobs even with full information over the set of potential
1For example, Altonji and Paxson (1988) show that wages are affected by hours constraints; Hwang, Mortensen,
and Reed (1998) use a search model to show how estimates of compensating differentials may be biased.
1jobs and who are not subject to employment or earnings shocks. Moreover, the movement from
high to low paying jobs is consistent with the data. Using the Panel Study of Income Dynamics
it is possible to identify workers who have changed employers voluntarily.2 That is, workers
who report they were neither ﬁred nor subject to a layoff or shutdown. While the majority of the
voluntary leavers move to new jobs that pay more than their previous job, a surprisingly substantial
proportion (approximately 42%) move to new jobs where the wages are actually lower.3 This
paper provides a model that can account for workers moving from either high to low or low to high
paying jobs where the direction of the movement depends upon the worker’s (relative) rate of time
preference.
Recently, there have been several papers that are related in spirit to the idea in this paper,
namely that observing the initial wage at a job may not reﬂect the overall “value” of the job. Dey
and Flinn (2003) examine the relationship between wages and health provision in a search model.
They ﬁnd that although some employers may not offer health insurance, workers essentially “pay”
for health insurance in terms of lower wages. Although health insurance in their model plays the
role of an amenity in that it is job speciﬁc, they do not analyze the sequencing of job choice over
the life cycle.
Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002) and Connolly and Gottschalk (2002) where workers move from
higher to lower paying jobs. The key to such movement in their models is that workers may move
from higher to lower wage jobs if there exists the possibility of higher future wage growth in the
lower paying job. The point here is that the current wage does not capture the “value” of a job,
where the value of a job is given by the lifetime income that it generates. Hence, a job that has a
current low wage, but high wage growth potential, may be preferred to a job that currently has a
high wage but low wage growth. This implies that workers may willingly migrate from (current)
high paying jobs to low paying ones. Our model is not inconsistent with this notion, but makes the
additional point that the “value” of a job may also depend upon non-wage considerations, such as
amenities–and these non-wage considerations may be an important determinant of job choice.
2Although in principle it is difﬁcult to know whether a separation is voluntary or involuntary, the question in the
PSID asks workers to choose from several reasons as to why they left their last job, one of which being that they chose
to leave.
3The model makes no distinction between employer changes or job changes, though in the PSID the question
concerns employer changes. However, in this paper, job and employer changes are used interchangeably.
2In this paper a comparison of lifetime incomes across jobs, i.e., knowing the slope of the wage
proﬁle for each job, does not necessarily determine the initial choice of a job nor the direction of
movement from low to high or high to low paying jobs.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents some stylized facts associated with job
changes by workers. These data help to both motive and bring perspective to our model, which
is presented in section 3. Section 4 analyzes the case where wages and amenities are not be
substitutable within a job, while section 5 analyzes the case where they are perfect substitutes.
Section 6 concludes.
2 Data Regarding Job Changes
Between 1984 and 1992 the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) asked individuals about their
current and previous employer. For those workers who changed employers, a number of questions
were asked: Their reasons for leaving the last employer; their wage with the last and current
employer; when they left their last employer and when they began their current employment. The
actual question for 1989 in the PSID and choice of response was:4
Question:
What happened with that employer—did the company go out of business, were you (HEAD)
laid off, did you quit, or what?
Responses:
1. Company folded/changed hands/moved out of town; employer died/went out of business
1989
2. Strike; lockout
3. Laid off; ﬁred
4. Quit; resigned; retired; pregnant; needed more money; just wanted a change in jobs; was
self- employed before
5. Other; transfer; any mention of armed services
6. Job was completed; seasonal work; was a temporary job
7. NA; DK
8. Inap.: not working for money now; no other main-job employer during 1988; still working
for other employer
4The question and responses are slightly different for some years.
3After responding that an employer change took place, some follow-up questions were asked. In
particular the worker was asked: How much their wage was when the job ended with their previous
employer, how much they earned when they started with their new employer. In addition, the date
of the ending of the last job and beginning of the current job was also asked. Reported wages were
converted to real wages using the monthly CPI since the dates of job endings and beginnings are
given as a month within the year.
For the nine years of data (1984-1992) containing the above question, there are 42,765 ob-
servations where the respondent had positive income, was either head of the household or spouse
of the head, and between the ages 18 and 70. The numbers in Table 1 and Table 2 are averages
using all employer changes throughout all of the years. That is, each job change is considered one
observation and no account is taken of the fact that some individuals in the data change employers
several times while others may change only once.
From that population there were 3,599 people who changed employers for any reason. Table 1
shows summary statistics for all employer changers in the PSID from 1984-1992.
Table 1: All Job Changers
To Lower Wage To Same Wage To Higher Wage
mean std. mean std. mean std.
% of Job Changers 0.421 0.494 0.084 0.277 0.495 0.500
Age 33.6 9.62 34.5 10.2 32.6 9.06
Months Between Jobs 1.49 2.03 0.003 .057 0.906 1.51
N 3,599
However, as mentioned above, this paper is concerned with those workers who answered with
response #4. Table 2 provides summary statistics for those who changed employers voluntarily.
There were 2,313 observations of employer changes between 1984 and 1992.
Though the majority of voluntary job changers, 53%, move to higher paying jobs, a very large
proportion of voluntary job changers, 42.5%, move to jobs that pay lower wages. There is very
little difference in age between those moving to higher or lower paying jobs, around 32-33 years of
4Table 2: Voluntary Job Changers
To Lower Wage To Same Wage To Higher Wage
mean std. mean std. mean std.
% of Job Changers 0.424 0.494 0.048 0.214 0.528 0.499
Age 32.7 9.13 33.4 10.8 32.0 8.58
Months Between Jobs 1.32 1.88 0.009 .095 0.920 1.50
N 2,313
age. The median percentage change in real wages for those moving to lower paying jobs is -17.8%,
while the median for those moving to higher paying jobs is nearly 20%, as can be seen in table 3.
The challenge posed by this data is to provide a coherent theory of why a large fraction of workers
move to higher paying jobs, while at the same time, a signiﬁcant fraction of workers move to lower
paying jobs.
Table 3: Wage Changes (%) for Voluntary Job Changers
Quantiles
10% 25% 50% 75% 90%
moved to:
lower wages -2.03 -7.46 -17.8 -40.5 -72.5
higher wages 4.08 9.43 19.8 41.4 73.6
Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002) and Connolly and Gottschalk (2002) motivate a worker moving
to a lower paying job by the potential for higher wage growth, compared to the worker’s current
job. Although it is possible to track wage growth before and after the switch, the PSID only asked
these job change questions between 1984 and 1992, so that there are not many years before or after
the job change. In any event, it is possible to look at those who changed jobs to lower paying jobs
exactly in the middle year of the data, 1988, and examine their wage growth four years before and
5four years after the job change. The results show very little difference between wage growth before
and after the employer change.
3 The Model
Workers are born at date 0 and live for one period of continuous time. At each instant in time
workers inelastically supply one unit of labor to a job. For simplicity, it is assumed that the there
are only two jobs, job 1 and job 2. Each job i ∈ 1,2 is characterized by a wage, wi, and a ﬁxed
level of the amenity, Ai. There is no uncertainty over the wage/amenity package at each job. At
each time t the worker decides where to work. The indicator function a(t) describes the worker’s
job choice at date t. In particular, if a(t) = 1, then the worker chooses job 1 at date t; if a(t) = 0,
then the worker chooses job 2 at date t.
Agent’s preferences are represented by the momentary utility function u(c(t),Ai), where c(t)
represents consumption of a private good at time t and Ai is the job amenity that the worker con-
sumes at date t. Agents discount the future at rate d and can borrow and lend at interest rate r. The
worker’s total savings (or stock of wealth) at date t is denoted by a(t). The instantaneous change
in the worker’s wealth at date t is given by the sum of (i) interest income on existing wealth, ra(t),
and (ii) the difference between the date t wage, wi, i ∈ {1,2}, and consumption at date t, c(t).
Below, an explicit structure on the momentary utility function will be imposed that will reﬂect the
assumed substitutability between wages and amenities.
In order to motivate the incentive to change jobs, jobs are parameterized so that w1 > w2 and
A1 < A2. One interpretation is that jobs where working conditions are not as pleasant pay a higher
wage.
4 Wages and Amenities are not Substitutable
This section speciﬁes a particular functional form for preferences where the wage alone does not
embody all of the relevant aspects of the job. The speciﬁcation assumes no within job substitutabil-
ity between the private good and the amenity. A momentary utility function for a worker choosing
job i that embodies this notion is given by:
u(c,Ai) = ln(c)+Ai. (1)
6As will be seen below, with this speciﬁcation of preferences, private consumption is independent
of the level of amenity consumption in the sense that, for a given level of lifetime income, the
optimal path of private consumption will not depend on the path of amenity consumption.
Obviously, if the instantaneous utility associated with job i, ln(wi)+Ai, is sufﬁciently larger
than the instantaneous utility associated with job j, ln(wj)+Aj, then the worker will choose job i
and will remain in that job for life. Hence, the decision to change jobs becomes meaningful only if
the difference between the instantaneous utilities of the two jobs is not “too big.” In fact, assuming
that this difference is zero provides the main insights as well as making the problem simpler to
solve; therefore, it is assumed that
ln(w1)+A1 = ln(w2)+A2. (2)








˙ a(t) = a(t)r+a(t)(w1−c(t))+(1−a(t))(w2−c(t)). (4)
and
a(0) = a(1) = 0 (5)
The objective function (3) is the worker’s lifetime utility. Equation (4) describes how wealth
evolves over time. The equations contained in (5) simply say that the worker begins life with no
wealth and (optimally) ends life with no wealth.
The (current value) Hamiltonian, H , associated with the maximization problem (3)-(5) is,
H = a(t)(ln(c(t))+A1)+(1−a(t))(ln(c(t))+A2)+ (6)
l(t)(a(t)r+a(t)w1+(1−a(t))w2−c(t)).









A1−A2+l(t)(w1−w2) > 0 if a(t) = 1
A1−A2+l(t)(w1−w2) < 0 if a(t) = 0
A1−A2+l(t)(w1−w2) = 0 if a(t) = 1 or a(t) = 0
(8)
and








The shape of the consumption proﬁle is given by the sign of r−d; if r−d > 0, then consumption
is strictly increasing over the worker’s life; if r−d < 0, then consumption is strictly decreasing
over the worker’s life; and if r−d = 0, then consumption is constant.
The worker’s job choice, a(t), is determined by (8). Since lt = 1/c(t), the worker’s job choice
can be simpliﬁed to













Hence, if at date t the worker’s level of consumption is less than w1−w2
A2−A1, then at date t it is optimal
for the worker to be at job 1, (inequality (11)); if at date t the worker’s level of consumption is
greater than w1−w2
A2−A1, then at date t it is optimal for the worker to be at job 2, (inequality (12)).
Notice that the worker will always change jobs at least once. To see this suppose that the
worker chooses job 1 and remains there for life. Then, equations (4), (5), and (10) imply that at
some date t ∈ [0,1] the worker’s level of consumption must equal w1. But if the worker spends all










The right hand side of (15) is simply a linear approximation of ln(w2) taken at w1. But ln(·) is a
strictly concave function, which means that the right hand side of (15) must be strictly greater than
the left hand side, which is a contradiction of inequality (15). Therefore, it must be the case that
w1 > w1−w2
A2−A1, which implies, by (12), that the worker will not remain at job 1 forever.
Similarly, if we suppose that the worker spends all of life in job 2, then at some date t ∈ [0,1],










For exactly the same kind of reasoning as above—i.e., the right hand side of (17) is a linear ap-
proximation of ln(w1) taken at w2—inequality (17) can not possibly hold. Hence, w2 < w1−w2
A2−A1,
which, by (11), contradicts the assertion that the worker will spend all of life in job 2.
Given that the worker will always change jobs, the sequence of job choices depends on r−d,
as shown in the following subsections.
4.1 r > d
When r > d, it is never optimal for the worker to move from job 2 to job 1. (This implies that
the worker will change jobs only once.) If the worker did follow this job sequence, then, by
(11), it must be the case that consumption falls after the job change. However, when r > d the
worker’s optimal consumption stream, implicitly given by (10), is always strictly increasing over
time. Hence, the only possible equilibrium job choice strategy for the worker is to spend the ﬁrst
part of life at job 1 and the second part in job 2. This sequence of job choices is consistent with
a strictly increasing lifetime consumption proﬁle, i.e., it is consistent with (11), (12) and (13). It
is rather interesting to note, in light of the data presented in Section 2, that when r > d the worker
will actually move from a high wage job to a low wage job.
4.2 r < d
When r < d, equation (10) implies that the worker’s lifetime consumption proﬁle will be strictly
decreasing over time. Hence, it is never optimal for the worker to change from job 1 to job 2,
as this sequencing of job choices would not be consistent with a strictly decreasing consumption
proﬁle, i.e., see (11) and (12). The equilibrium job choice strategy for the worker will be to spend
the ﬁrst part of life at job 2 and the second part at job 1; this sequence of job choice is consistent
with a strictly decreasing lifetime consumption proﬁle and the worker will change jobs only once.
When r < d the worker will move from low wage jobs to high wage jobs.
94.3 d = r
When the discount rate equals the interest rate, equation (10) implies that the worker’s lifetime
consumption stream will be constant. Since the worker changes jobs at least once and lifetime
consumption is constant, it must be the case that c(t) = w1−w2
A2−A1 for all t ∈ [0,1].
The worker’s initial job choice and the number of job changes will now be characterized. The
following notation turns out to be helpful. Deﬁne D ≡
R 1




ti e−rtdt, where tj >ti.
One can interpret both D and d
tj
ti in terms of “discounted time.” That is, D represents the discounted
value of one unit of time starting at t = 0; d
tj
ti represents the discounted value of tj−ti units of time
ti units of time from now. The present value of lifetime consumption when c(t) = w1−w2
A2−A1 for all
t ∈ [0,1] is then simply w1−w2
A2−A1D.
If the worker’s initial job choice is, say, job 1, and changes jobs n times, where the last job is,













ti = D, where t0 ≡ 0 and tn+1 ≡ 1, and that for a given r, D is just a number. The




















tn units of discounted time at job 2. But, since D1 = D−D2, equation (19) is simply an
equation in one unknown, D1. Call the solution D∗














Above, it was assumed that the worker’s initial job choice was job 1, changed jobs n times and
the last job was job 2. It turns out that there is nothing special about this sequencing of job choices.
All that is required is that the worker spend D∗
1 units of discounted time in job 1 and D∗
2 = D−D∗
1
units of discounted time in job 2. It does not matter where the worker’s initial job is, how many
times he changes jobs or what his last job is; all that is required is that he spend the fraction D∗
1/D
of discounted time in job 1 and the remainder in job 2.
To sum up, the sign of r−d determines whether the worker moves from a high paying job to a
low paying one or from the low paying job to a higher paying one. When r >d, the worker changes
10jobs once and moves from the high to low paying job. When r < d, the worker also changes jobs
once but moves from the low to high paying job. When r = d the worker will change jobs at least
once and is indifferent between job 1 and job 2 as an initial job.
4.4 Discussion
4.4.1 Initial Job Choice
The intuition behind the choice of an initial job is easiest to see by ﬁxing the amount of time spent
in each job. By choosing job 1, the higher wage job, ﬁrst, lifetime income will be higher than if job
2 is choosen ﬁrst; and, the higher the interest rate, r, the greater will be the difference in lifetime
incomes. So, as the interest rate increases job 1 looks more and more attractive as a starting job.
Conversely, job 2, as an initial job choice, will provide a higher lifetime value of amenities as
will job 1 as an initial job choice; as the discount rate, d, rises, the greater will be the difference
in lifetime value of amenities. As a result, the higher the discount rate for a worker, the more
attractive job 2 looks as a starting job.
When r > d the “interest rate effect” associated with taking job 1 ﬁrst dominates the “discount
rate effect” of taking job 2 ﬁrst. So, lifetime utility is higher when job 1 is chosen ﬁrst. When r <d
the “discount rate effect” dominates the “interest rate effect,” leading to higher lifetime utility by
choosing job 2 ﬁrst. When r = d, the “interest rate effect” associated with taking job 1 ﬁrst exactly
offsets the “discount rate effect” associated with taking job 2 ﬁrst, implying that the worker is
indifferent between choosing job 1 and job 2 at date t = 0.
4.4.2 Why Do Workers Change Jobs?
In order to gain some intuition as to why individuals change jobs, assume that a worker lives for
only an instant of time. As a ﬁrst approximation, this allows us to ignore discounting.5 Imagine
that in this instant unit of time the worker spends a fraction q in job 1 and (1−q) in job 2. Over
this instant of time ﬁnancial markets permit the worker to smooth consumption of the market good,
c, i.e., the worker can consume approximately ¯ w = qw1+(1−q)w2. But, of course, the worker is
5Discounting is important in terms of explaining which job the worker will initially take but is not that important
in terms of explaining why workers change jobs. For example, when r = d = 0, although the worker is indifferent
between which job to take at date t = 0, he is not indifferent between changing and not changing jobs; he strictly
prefers to change jobs.
11unable to smooth the consumption of the amenity since the amenity is job speciﬁc. Hence, if the
worker smooths consumption of the market good, utility over the instant of time is (approximately)
equal to qu( ¯ w,A1)+(1−q)u( ¯ w,A2). If the worker spends the entire instant of time in either job 1
or job 2, i.e., the worker does not change jobs, then utility is equal to u(w1,A1) = u(w1,A2). The
worker will prefer changing jobs, compared to staying in the same job, if
ln( ¯ w)+ ¯ A > ln(w1)+A1 = ln(w2)+A2 (21)
= q(ln(w1)+A1)+(1−q)(ln(w2)+A2),
where ¯ A = qA1+(1−q)A2. Since ln( ¯ w) > qln(w1)+(1−q)ln(w2), inequality (21) holds. Hence,
workers want to change jobs because they effectively get to consume “the average” of bundles
(w1,A1) and (w2,A2) and the only way to consume an average of the bundles is by changing jobs.6
4.4.3 Many Jobs
Exceptfortheknife-edgecasewherer=d, workerswillchangejobsexactlyonceintheirlifetimes.
In reality, however, some workers may never change jobs or other workers may change jobs more
than once over their lifetimes.
The model can be generalized along two dimensions. Suppose ﬁrst that the instantaneous
utilities associated with each job need not be equal. 7 Second, suppose that instead of facing two
possible job choices each worker is randomly given n > 2 jobs to choose from. Without loss of
generality, let job 1 be the “best” job and job n be the “worst” job in the following sense,
u(w1,A1) ≥ u(w2,A2) ≥ ··· ≥ u(wn,An). (22)
If it turns out that the instantaneous utility of job 1 is substantially higher than job 2, then the
worker chooses job 1 at date t = 0 and will never change jobs. The case considered in the body
of the paper can be interpreted by having the instantaneous utilities of job 1 and job 2 not being
signiﬁcantly different from one another, but the instantaneous utility of job 2 substantially larger
than job 3. In this situation, the worker will change jobs once: which job the worker chooses ﬁrst
6Note that the inequality (22) is actually a statement about quasi-concavity. Recall that the notion of quasi-
concavity is that a consumer can be made better off by consuming the average of two bundles that provide the same
level of utility compared to consuming either one of the bundles.
7Recall that u(w1,A1)=u(w2,A2) has been assumed for analytical reasons. By continuity, all of our results will go
through if u(w1,A1) 6= u(w2,A2) but are “close” in value to one another. Clearly, if the instantaneous utility associated
with one job is signiﬁcantly higher than another then the worker will choose the “high” utility job and will not change
jobs.
12will depend upon the sign of r−di. In general, if the instantaneous utilities associated with the ﬁrst
k jobs are not signiﬁcantly different from one another, but there is a signiﬁcant difference between
the kth and k+1st job, then the worker will change jobs k times. So by increasing the number of
jobs available to workers and by relaxing the assumption that instantaneous utility of all jobs is
equal, it is possible for the model to be consistent with observed outcomes in the data.
4.4.4 Worker Heterogeneity
In the data, some individuals move from lower to higher paying jobs, while other individuals move
from higher to lower paying jobs. The model can be made consistent with these observed facts
if workers are heterogeneous. For example, one simple form of heterogeneity is that different
workers have different discount rates. Let di be the discount rate for worker i. One can imagine
that there is a population of workers and a distribution of discount rates over this population. All
workers, i, that have discount rates greater than the interest rate, i.e., di >r, will spend the ﬁrst part
of life at the low paying job and the second part at the high paying job; all workers, i, characterized
by di < r will spend the ﬁrst part of the life at the high paying job and the second part at the low
paying job. Hence, heterogeneity along the worker discount rate dimension can generate ﬂows of
workers moving from low to high paying jobs and at the same time ﬂows of workers moving from
high to low paying jobs.
It might be interesting to know which workers starting at, say job 1 (workers with relatively
low discount rates), will be the ﬁrst to change jobs; the higher discount rate workers or the lower?
Although it is not possible to get an analytical solution to this answer, numerical solutions are
possible. The numerical solutions are performed for the case where the consumption good and
amenity are not substitutable. It is also necessary to assign values to the parameters w1, w2, A1,
r and d. Note that A2 can not be chosen independently of w1, w2 and A1, and is determined by
(2).8 The values chosen for the numerical solutions presented below are w1 = 10, w2 = 7 , A1 = 5,
and then from (2), A2 = 5.36. The interest rate, r is set equal to 0.05 and d varies between 0.001
and 0.1. Qualitatively speaking, the numerical results for other parameter values are the same as
those presented below as long as the difference in wages is not “too small” and d is economically
8Or more to the point, only three of the four job parameters can be chosen independently, the fourth being deter-
mined by (2)
13reasonable, i.e., values of d corresponding to discount factors that are greater than 0.9. Roughly
speaking this implies that d ≤ 0.1.
Deﬁne qij as the fraction of time spent in the initial job where the initial job is i. For the param-
eters chosen, it turns out that, independent of the location of the starting job, workers with a higher
discount rate will change jobs ﬁrst, see ﬁgures 1 and 2. In fact, for economically relevant values
of d and, as long as the difference between the wages is not “too small”, numerical simulations
indicate that the time spent in the ﬁrst job is a strictly decreasing monotonic function of d. For val-
ues of d that are not economically relevant, i.e., d > .1, then q21 may display a non-monotonicity.
Speciﬁcally, as d increases, it is possible that in some region q21 may increase. However, after this
increase, q21 is again a monotonically decreasing function of (higher) d’s. When the difference
between the wages is “not big” q12 may display a similar non-monotonicity over a range of d’s.
5 Wages and Amenities are “Perfect Substitutes”
The model developed so far makes the rather extreme assumption that wages and amenities are not
at all substitutable. To see if such an extreme assumption is the driving force behind why a worker
changes jobs and/or the sequencing of job choice over a worker’s lifetime, this section analyzes
the opposite extreme where wages and amenities are “perfect substitutes.” Now, unlike the case
when wages and amenities are not substitutable, the optimal consumption path of the private good
will depend critically on the path of amenity consumption. It will be shown below that even when
wages and amenities are perfect substitutes, workers may decide to change jobs and, as above, if
the worker chooses to change jobs, the sequence of job choices is determined by the sign of r−d.
The momentary utility function is now assumed to take the form
u(c(t),Ai) = ln(c(t)+Ai). (23)
It is useful for what follows to deﬁne wi +Ai as the “aggregate wage” for job i and c(t)+Ai as
“aggregate consumption.”
Suppose, but only for the time being, that the worker chooses a job at date 0 and remains at
that job for life. If the worker chooses job i, then the lifetime consumption-saving decision is







˙ ai(t) = rai(t)+wi−ci(t) (25)
ai(0) = ai(1) = 0 (26)
ci(t) ≥ 0 (27)
Qualitatively speaking, the only difference between this maximization problem and the one studied
in the previous section is to be found in constraint (27). This constraint says that private consump-
tion can not be negative.9 When this constraint binds it means the worker would, in some time
periods, prefer to consume less than Ai, saving now to increase consumption in some other pe-
riods. Such a strategy, however, is not feasible because the amenity can not be saved—it must
be “consumed” in its entirety at each point in time. Optimal consumption is characterized in the
following subsections, ﬁrst when constraint (27) does not bind, and then when it does bind. A
discussion concerning optimal job choice follows.
5.1 Constraint (27) Does Not Bind
Under the assumption that constraint (27) does not bind, the (current value) Hamiltonian for the
above maximization problem is,
H = ln(ci(t)+Ai)+li(t)(ai(t)r−wi−ci(t)). (28)




−li(t) = 0, (29)
˙ li(t) =Hai(t)−l(t)r = −li(t)(r−d). (30)






Hence, when r > d, the worker’s aggregate consumption is increasing over time; when r < d, it is
decreasing; and when r = d, it is constant.
Equations (29) and (30), in conjunction with the lifetime budget constraint,
R
ci(t)e−rtdt =
9Such a constraint was not required in the previous section’s model because the marginal utility of private con-
sumption is inﬁnite when private consumption is zero.
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e(r−d)t, t ∈ [0,1]. (32)
5.2 Constraint (27) Does Bind
Now, suppose constraint (27) does bind. Under the assumption (relaxed below) that the worker
must keep for life the job he chooses at date 0, the Lagrangian for the worker’s maximization
problem (24)-(27) is given by,
L = H +gi(t)ci(t) (33)
= ln(ci(t)+Ai+li(t)(ai(t)r−wi−ci(t))+gi(t)ci(t)
where gi(t) is the multiplier associated with the constraint that consumption must be non-negative.
Since the solution to the worker’s problem is straightforward, if somewhat tedious, many of the
technical details are omitted in what follows. Intuitively, if the worker chooses job i, then aggregate
consumption will be Ai when constraint (27) binds; and when this constraint does not bind, aggre-
gate consumption grows at the rate r−d. As in the previous section, it will be most convenient to
describe the optimal consumption paths under three separate cases: (i) r > d; (ii) r < d; and (iii)
r = d.
5.2.1 r > d
When r > d, the worker’s optimal aggregate consumption path is non-decreasing. The worker’s
aggregate consumption from job i, ci(t)+Ai, is given by
ci(t)+Ai =

Ai for t ∈ [0,t∗
i ]
Aie(r−d)(t−t∗
i ) for t ∈ (t∗
i ,1]
, (34)
where gi(t) > 0 for t ∈ [0,t∗
i ] and gi(t) = 0 for t ∈ (t∗
i ,1]. Optimal aggregate consumption paths for
the worker are depicted in Figure 3. As in the previous section, in order to facilitate comparison
between the two jobs, assume for the time being that w1+A1 = w2+A2. The aggregate consump-
tion path c∗ in ﬁgure 3 assumes that it is possible to borrow and/or save the amenity, i.e., it is the
optimal consumption plan when one ignores constraint (27). Note that for this consumption path
c∗(t) < Ai for some t; hence, for some t, constraint (27) must bind. If the worker takes job 1 and
constraint (27) is not ignored, then the worker’s consumption will be equal to A1 for all t ∈ [0,t∗
1],
after which aggregate consumption grows at the rate of r−d. This consumption path is depicted
16as c∗
1 in Figure 3. Similarly, if the worker takes job 2 and constraint (27) is not ignored, then
the worker’s consumption will be equal to A2 for all t ∈ [0,t∗
2] after which aggregate consumption
grows at the rate of r−d. This consumption path is depicted as c∗
2 in Figure 3.
5.2.2 r < d
When r > d, the worker’s optimal aggregate consumption path is non-increasing. The worker’s
optimal aggregate consumption, ci(t)+Ai, is given by
ci(t)+Ai =

(ci(0)+Ai)e(r−d)t for t ∈ [0,t∗
i ]
Ai for t ∈ (t∗
i ,1]
, (35)
where gi(t) = 0 for t ∈ [0,t∗
i ] and gi(t) > 0 for t ∈ (t∗
i ,1]. The worker’s aggregate consumption at
date 0 is ci(0) at job i and can be shown to be equal to Ai(e−(r−d)t∗
i −1).10 The optimal aggregate
consumption paths for the worker are depicted in Figure 4. As in Figure 3, it is assumed that
w1 +A1 = w2 +A2 and the consumption path c∗ allows the possibility to borrow and save the




the worker’s consumption is equal to A1; see consumption proﬁle c∗
1 in Figure 4. Similarly, if the




2 in Figure 4.
5.2.3 r = d
When r = d, the worker’s optimal aggregate consumption path is constant. The worker’s optimal
aggregate consumption, ci(t)+Ai, is given by
ci(t)+Ai = wi+Ai for all t ∈ (0,1]. (37)
Note that constraint (27) can not bind when r = d since, in equilibrium, ci(t) = wi > 0 for all
t ∈ (0,1]
10It can be shown that t∗















Whenconstraint(27)doesnot bind, theoptimalaggregateconsumptionequation, (32), impliesthat
the aggregate wage is a “sufﬁcient statistic” for the job. Sufﬁcient statistic means that the worker
will choose that job that has the highest aggregate wage and has no incentive to switch jobs later
on. Since at each point in time aggregate consumption is higher for higher aggregate wage jobs,
see equation (32), the worker will choose and remain in the job that has the higher aggregate wage,
w1+A2 or w2+A2. In this situation, the worker has no strict incentive to change jobs. So unlike
the case where private consumption and the amenity are not substitutable, when the instantaneous
utilities of the two jobs are the same, the worker is indifferent between changing jobs or not. In
fact, if there is an arbitrarily small cost associated with changing jobs, a worker will strictly prefer
not to change jobs when the instantaneous utilities of the two jobs are the same. When private
consumption and the amenity are not substitutable and the instantaneous utilities of the two jobs
are the same, the worker will still strictly prefer to change jobs when there is an arbitrarily small
cost associated with moving. Note that when r = d, constraint (27) never binds. In this situation,
the aggregate wage is again a sufﬁcient statistic for the job.
The remainder of the discussion assumes that constraint (27) does bind, which necessarily
implies that either r > d or r < d. When w1 +A1 = w2 +A2 the lifetime utility associated with
job 1 will be strictly greater than the lifetime utility associated with job 2. The easiest way to see
this is to note that since w1+A1 = w2+A2, it is possible to replicate the optimal job 2 aggregate
consumption proﬁle, c∗
2, when in job 1; however, since A2 > A1 it is not possible to replicate the




1 is higher than that associated with consumption proﬁle c∗
2. Note also that the constraint (27)
binds for a longer period of time in job 2, compared to job 1; loosely speaking, the consumption
proﬁle c∗
2 is “farther away” from the unconstrained consumption proﬁle, c∗, than is consumption
proﬁle c∗
1 in Figures 3 and 4. Finally, when w1+A1 = w2+A2, the worker does not have a (strict)
incentive to change jobs. If there is an arbitrarily some cost associated with moving, then the
worker’s optimal strategy is to take job 1 and remain at it for the rest of life.
Now suppose that w1+A1 ≥ w2+A2. Then the worker will choose and will remain in job 1
18for life. Clearly, if the worker prefers job 1 to job 2 when w1+A1 = w2+A2, job 1 will continue
to be preferred to job 2 when w1+A1 > w2+A2. Hence when w1+A1 ≥ w2+A2, as in the case
where constraint (27) does not bind, the aggregate wage is a sufﬁcient statistic for the job in the
sense that the worker will choose and remain in the job that pays the highest (aggregate) wage.
Suppose now that w1+A1 <w2+A2. If the worker must stay at a job for life, then job 1 will be
chosen over job 2 if the difference between the aggregate wages between jobs 1 and 2 is “small.”11
To see this, note that although job 2 provides the worker with a higher aggregate lifetime income,
job 1 provides a “less constrained” consumption proﬁle. So when the aggregate wage differences
between the jobs are “small” the latter effect will dominate the former. More importantly, in this
situation—where the aggregate wage in job 2 exceeds that of job 1 but the difference in aggregate
wages is small—the worker will actually want to change jobs. To see this, and without loss of
generality, assume that r >d. In Figure 5, c∗
1 represents the consumption proﬁle if the worker stays
forever in job 1. Suppose that a worker chooses job 1 and follows the consumption proﬁle c∗
1 until
time ˆ t, where c∗
1(ˆ t) = A2, at which time switches to job 2 for the remainder of life, see Figure 5.
Since w2+A2 > w1+A1, the worker will be able to consume more than c∗
1(t) in all t ≥ ˆ t; hence it
is optimal for the worker to change jobs. The optimal consumption proﬁle for the individual, c∗
12,
and the optimal time to change jobs, date t∗, are described in Figure 5. When r > d and constraint
(27) binds, the worker consumes A1 for t ∈ [0,t1], after which aggregate consumption grows at the
rate of r−d. The critical dates, t1 and t∗, are determined by the equations:
c∗














The ﬁrst equation says that the optimal aggregate consumption at the time the worker changes
jobs, date t∗, is equal to A2. The second equation simply says that lifetime aggregate consumption
equals lifetime aggregate wages.
Assume that constraint (27) binds, w2 +A2 > w1 +A1 and the difference between aggregate
wages is not “too big.” Then, when r > d, the worker will initially choose job 1 and will ultimately
11When w1 +A1 = w2 +A2, the worker strictly prefers job 1 to job 2. If (w2 +A2)−(w1 +A1) = e, where e is
arbitrarily small, then, by continuity, the worker will continue to strictly prefer job 1 to job 2.
19switch to job 2. In this case the worker will be observed to move from a low paying job to a high
paying job. And, when r < d, the worker will initially choose job 2 and will ultimately switch to
job 1. In this case, the worker will be observed to move from a high paying job to a low paying
one.
In sum, when amenities are not an important component of aggregate wages, then the aggre-
gate wage will be a sufﬁcient statistic for the job. The idea here is that since amenities are a small
component of aggregate wages, constraint (27) will probably not bind. However, when amenities
become a more important component of aggregate wages, then aggregate wages will not neces-
sarily be a sufﬁcient statistic for the job. This happens precisely when the aggregate wage of the
high amenity job exceeds the aggregate wage of the low amenity job, but by not too much. In this
situation the worker will change jobs so as to obtain the beneﬁts associated with each job: job 1
offers a less constrained consumption proﬁle and job 2 offers a higher lifetime aggregate wage. So
just as in the case where the wage and amenity are not substitutable, a model where wages and
amenities are perfectly substitutable can have workers moving from high to low or from low to
high paying jobs. And, if workers do change jobs, the direction of the movement depends on the
relative magnitude of the rate of time preference.
6 Conclusions
Individuals may rationally choose to move from high paying jobs to lower paying ones as part
of an optimal lifetime plan. A key insight to this observation is that a job is more than just a
wage; workers also care about non-wage dimensions of a job. In the data, the majority of workers
who voluntarily change jobs, move to higher wages. Our model would identify these individual
as having “relatively high” discount rates. The data also document that a large proportion of
voluntary job changers move to lower paying jobs. Our model would identify these workers as
patient, “relatively low” discount rate individuals.
The particular speciﬁcation of preferences analyzed above are not the only ones that imply that




for −¥ < r < 1, computational experiments show that as long as the difference in instantaneous
20utility associated with each job is not too big, then worker’s will want to change jobs. Note that as
long as −¥ < r < 1, the marginal utility associated with zero consumption of the private good is
inﬁnite. So, just as the case when the wage and amenity are not substitutable, with CES preferences
workers want to change jobs so that they can consume the “average” of both jobs bundles. The
direction of job movement—from low to high or high to low paying jobs—is determined by the
relative magnitude of the worker’s discount rate.
21Figure 1: Moving Time: Job 1 to Job 2









Figure 2: Moving Time: Job 2 to Job 1
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